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I INTRODUCTION 
Hanna Schulte was all set to see America the Greyhound 
way ••• But when [the German college student] arrived 
at Dulles International Airport last week, she asked 
about air fares anyway. "I had no idea how cheap the 
flying is here," she sai~ ••• "I don't think I'll need 
to take a bus anywhere." 
This brief excerpt, although not particularly fascinating in 
its revelation, is exemplitive of a far more complex aspect of 
modern American economic policy. During the 1930's, American 
regulatory fervor was at its peak. Fear of a repeated economic 
upheaval, like that of 1929, compounded with the exorbitant 
profits 'earned by the robber barons spawned government 
intervention. Consequently, regulation was imposed upon numerous 
industries, including air and bus transport. 
Four decades later restrictions have been lifted not only in 
the airline industry but in the intercity bus industry as well. 
These changes are part of the new laissez faire government of the 
late 1970's and, thus far, the 1980's. By allowing the owners of 
industry and business to essentially go 'head to head', the 
government has introduced very powerful market forces which 
threaten to shake the stability of some of this nation's more 
steadfast corporat'ions. Those companies that first come to mind 
within the transportation sector are. Greyhound and Trailways, 
clearly the market leaders for the bus industry. 
This paper is founded on the contention that the government, 
in deregulating the airline industry, failed to take into account 
the 'spillover' effects for other industries. The industry of 
particular interest within this context is the intercity bus 
industry. The intercity bus industry has received very little 
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notoriety with respect to airline deregulation. In fact, it has 
received very little attention altogether from both media and 
academia. There are, for instance, no definitive texts on the 
industry, nor has there been a proliferation of studies conducted 
with regard to industrial analysis. This is only partially 
explained by the bus companies themselves, which inhibit the 
degree of industrial analysis through protective proprietary 
policies. 
It is, therefore, the purpose of this paper to analyze the 
effect that airline deregulation has had on the 'intercity bus 
industry. The paper begins with a brief historical sketch for 
the intercity bus industry, including a description of the 
cond~tions under regulation. This is followed by a discussion of 
the Bus Regulatory Reform Act and its effects upon the industry. 
In section III, I analyze the structure of the bus industry, 
placing particular emphasis on market concentration, demand, and 
profitability. This is followed by an analysis o·f the factors 
responsible for the industry's financial decline. In section IV, 
I introduce evidence that suggests that the air and bus 
industries are linked, which is followed by a brief historical 
sketch of the airline industry. section VI offers a comparison 
of the demand demographics ' between bus and air travel. Finally, 
I conclude the paper with an empirical analysis of the effect of 
airline deregulation on the demand for bus service. This end is 
achieved in two parts. First, I demonstrate that airline 
deregulation has led to a drop in the level of fares. Secondly, I 
estimate the supply and demand equations for the bus industry and 
demonstrate that the quantity demanded of bus travel is, in part, 
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dependent upon the price ot air travel. 
Before we turn to the body of the paper it is first 
necessary to clarify certain aspects of the transportation 
i ,ndustry. In transportation markets, demand is spatially- or 
time- located. Furthermore, demand is assumed to be random, and 
depends on availability of service. According to Pablo Spiller 
in his paper on Quality. capacity and Regulation, transportation 
II-firms supply capacity and determine location and price before 
demand is realized." 2 All public transportation markets are 
similar in that their product cannot be stored. Empty seats in a 
train, bus , or airplane, signify lost revenue. The marginal cost 
of an additional traveler in any mode is almost neqligible, save 
the cost of the meals offered in some airlines. Therefore, un-
occupied seats in any transport mode are considered a "dead-
weight, loss that can never be recovered. ,,3 Therefore., all 
transport strives for hiqh load factors. A load factor is 
defined to be the percent of seats in a transport vehicle that 
are occupied by passenqers. Finally, it is important to 
distinquish betwe"en intramodal and intermodal competition. 
Intramodal competition is that which arises between carriers of 
the same industry. Intermodal competition includes all transport 
modes which are viable SUbstitutes with one another. These 
points are important to keep in mind, throuqhout the analysis of 
this paper. 
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II Historv of the Intercity Bus Industrv 
Introduction 
..... the or~g~n of the Greyhound Lines [c.19ll] is 
said to be a four-mile run between Hibbing and Alice, 
Minnesota, in an open-air, seven passenger Hupmobile, 
at a fare of fifte1n cents one-way or twenty-five 
cents round-trip." 
The first two decades of the twentieth century in America 
marked a time when there was very little choice between 
alternative modes of transportation. Transportation was regarded 
by many as a luxury good, explained, not py price, but by its 
relative scarcity. The dominant mode was rail travel, 
supplemented predominantly by bus. Bus transport was not 
perceived by either consumer or producer, as a substitute good 
for rail. Instead, bus transport was utilized only as a means of 
. 
getting to the closest railway station. 
By the 1920's many railroads found themselves in financ~al 
disarray. In an attempt to reduce losses, unprofitable routes 
were abandoned. In order to compensate for the lost revenue 
along these routes, many railroad owners adopted bus transport as 
a low cost alternative means of transport. It was soon realized 
that bus service need not be confined to intrastate travel, and 
consequently, it became regarded as a viable means for regional 
and cross country transportation. 
Regulation 
As the intercity bus industry grew, both financially and 
geographically, government began to take interest in its 
development. The first sign of regulation began at the state 
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level in Pennsylvania in 1914. By 1930, all but two states had 
imposed some form of restriction upon bus service. 
The impetus behind regulation in the bus industry changed 
over the years. Initially, government was concerned about 
insuring passenger safety and highway protection. Early 
ordinances stressed this aim. However, as the industry began to 
grow at an enormous rate in the 1920's, the state governments 
began to focus upon the economic implications that surfaced. 
There arose concern for what the government called 'economic 
stability' in the bus industry. In real terms this meant that the 
government believed it was necessary to place controls on fares 
and market entry. A report published by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission sums up the position of the state governments: 
" ••• most ••• adopted the viewpoint that a free market 
environment would result in lower load factors, higher 
costs, and less reliab2e and less comfortable service at fluctuating fares." -
Furthermore, they believed that by not restricting entry, new 
firms would be unnecessarily duplicating capital which would 
increase costs for the whole industry . They feared that these 
costs would eventually be transferred to the consumer. 
If we take into account our current knowledge of industrial 
organization, the government's fears do not appear to have been 
justified. First, if we accept the basic economic notion that 
markets left to themselves will realize an equilibrium condition 
that maximizes the combined surpluses of consumers and producers 
alike, then the intercity bus market, one could posit, would have 
been forced to price transport at the optimal rate. Assuming 
competitive market conditions (which did in fact exist at this 
time both in actual and potential competition) fares would have 
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been maintained at equilibrium levels. By restricting entry into 
the market, the government in effect, disrupted free market 
conditions by lessening competitive forces. In order to insure 
consumer protection, the only alternative they left themselves 
was the imposition of price controls. 
Intercity bus service was essentially reduced to the status 
of public utility and treated as if it were a regulated monopoly. 
It can be argued that such policy is justifiable if large 
economies of scale are inherent to the industry. We shall see in 
the following chapter, however, that this is not the case in the 
intercity bus industry. 
The government also failed to recognize that 'duplication of 
capital' by new entrants would shift the supply curve for bus 
transport out to the right. This would have lowered fares and 
increased the quantity of service available. The government's 
stance against an increase in capital in the bus industry, was in 
direct reaction to what happened in the railroad industry, years 
before. The railroads had purchased and employed an excess 
amount of fixed capital, resulting in a surplus of supply over 
demand. The government's mistake was in equating the cost 
structures of the two industries. The rail industry is very 
capital intensive, requiring enormous sums to cover its fixed 
costs. The bus industry, on the other hand, is dominated by its 
variable costs. Elizabeth Pinkston supports this by showing that 
average costs do not decrease over distance traveled (see 
appendix). It is unlikely that the increased costs (for the 
industry as a whole) associated with new entrants would have been 
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passed on to the consumer. A more probable result would have 
been a fare structure that more closely resembled costs. 
Government did not take these points into consideration and 
hence, regulations were imposed. Many states utilized regulation 
in order to insure that towns were sufficiently serviced. When 
states attempted to place controls on markets that extended 
outside of state borders, however, the federal government stepped 
in. In 1925, the Supreme Court ordered that states could not 
exercise control over interstate bus routes. Federal regulation, 
however, was not officially imposed until a decade later with the 
Motor Carrier Act of 1935. 
The Motor Carrier Act led to over forty years of intercity 
bus regulation. It was established in the wake of the Great 
Depression,in order to instill econo~ic stability and prevent 
further financial disaster. The Interstate Commerce Commissions' 
interpretation of the act imposed restrictions on entry, exit and 
pricing policies. The Commission determined licensing of 
carriers, mergers or transferrals of operating rights, and the 
setting of fares and safety precautions. 
According to established policy, regulatory matters 
involving interstate and intrastate routes were delegated to the 
federal and . state governments, respectively. On the federal 
level, the government practiced a very strict policy with regard 
to entry into the intercity market. In fact, they exercised a 
form of protectionism, where applications by prospective entrants 
were carefully scrutinized to determine if they posed a threat to 
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the established firms: 
The question, in substance, is whether the new 
operation or service will serve a useful public 
purpose, responsive to a public demand or need; 
whether this purpose can and will be served as well by 
existing lines or carriers; and whether it can be 
served by applicant with the new operation or service 
proposed without endangering or impairing the 
operations of existing carri!rs contrary to the public 
interest. (emphasis inserted) 
The terms of firm exit, on the other hand, were quite flexible. 
The same held true for established terms of schedule frequency. 
On the state level, however, strict ordinances often barred exit 
from intrastate routes. This hardline policy, characteristic of 
most states, is best explained by political motives. If service 
was lost in any region, the governor would eventually be held 
responsible by those individuals affected. Thus~ the evidence 
suggests that on the federal level, regulation favored the 
protection of the industry, while at the state level, consumer 
interests were the primary aim. 
Deregulation 
It was only until the late 1970's that the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (I.C.C.) began to relax its entry standards. 
Studies leading up to deregulation pointed out that regulation 
was unnecessary and promoted inefficiency. In 1975, Elizabeth 
Pinkston completed her Ph.D. thesis on the intercity bus 
industry. She shared these same sentiments when she criticized 
the current regulation: 
unrestricted entry and expansion would not have a 
major detrimental effect on the quality or price of 
bus service and ••• on the contrary, some 
improvements might be forthcoming •••• Governmental 
regulation of the intercity bus transportation 
industry is found to be unnece2sary to ensure 
efficient resource allocation. 
Furthermore, in 1981 congress declared that: 
page 10 
the existing Federal and state regulatory structure 
has tended in certain circumstances to inhibit market 
entry, carrier growth, maximum utilization of 
equipment and energy resources, and opportunities for 
minorities and others to enter the motor bus 
industry. 6 
A direct result of the growing skepticism was an increase in 
the flexibility of regulatory conduct as administered by the 
I.C.C •• This led to a significant abandonment of less profitable 
routes by the majority of major carriers. Those routes dropped 
were characteristically ones that "did not fit in with major 
highway networks connecting large urban centers. 1I5 This 
abandonment was to continue into the early 1980's and reach its 
peak the year following deregulation in 1982. 
There were a number of factors which eventually led to the 
deregulation of the intercity bus industry. As demonstrated 
above, economists in the 1970's began reappraising the efficacy 
of regulation in terms of its economic efficiency. In 1975, the 
Brookings Institution published a report entitled Promoting 
Competition in Regulated Markets which questioned the economic 
justification of regulatory constraints in numerous industries. 
In addition, the of Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations have 
all been in support of deregulatory measures. Under Carter's ' 
term in office a number of industries were unshackled from 
governmental constraints and left to face free market conditions; 
among these were the trucking and airline industries. It was the 
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deregulation in the airline industry; however; which eventually 
led the managers in the intercity bus industry to push for their 
own deregulation. Greyhound and Trailways, the industry's two 
dominant firms, were both very active toward this end. In fact, 
three months after airline deregulation, Greyhound submitted to 
Congress, A Proposal for Federal Legislative Deregulation of 
the Intercity Bus Industry (February, 1979). The industry 
leaders hoped to obtain the freedom to restructure routes in 
order to achieve profit maximization. 
The u.s. Department of Transportation suggests an additional 
catalyst for deregulation. In their report on The Impacts of 
Regulatory Reform on Intercity Bus Service references are made to 
the competitive handicap that regulation has levied upon buses in 
relation to other modes of passenger transport. Particular 
emphasis is made with regard to the airline industry: 
Clearly, the major impetus behind enactment of the Act 
was a desire to make the motor bus industry more 
competitive at a time the industry was facing 
increased competitive pressure from other 
transportation modes. Regulatory reform in the 
passenger airline industry had dramatically altered 
airline fare structures on many city-pairs that motor 
buses also served. without similar reform for the bus 
industry, it was thought that it would be unable to 
respond to these increased pressures and thus be faced 
with reduced passenger loads and, presumably, less 
favorable income and profit statements. 
Deregulation was finally achieved in 1982 with the Bus 
Regulatory Reform Act (BRRA). This act essentially liberalized 
the restrictions on exit and route abandonment and eased the 
restrictions on entry requirements. The burden of proof for exit 
shifted from the firm to the regulatory commission. The Act also 
removed a provision which had prevented carriers from servicing 
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intermediate points. By loosening its constraints, the functions 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission were greatly reduced. The 
I.C.C., " ••• was cast in the role of referee and final arbitrator 
in any controversies and disputes that arise over motor bus 
service. liS 
Immediate Effects of Bus Deregulation 
Clearly, an entire paper could be dedicated to examining the 
effects of bus deregulation1 indeed, others have already achieved 
this end. It is, therefore, the purpose of this section to offer 
a brief synopsis of the after-effects of the BRRA in order to 
place this industry in proper perspective. This will, in turn, 
aid future analysis. 
Passage of the Bus Regulatory Reform" Act has had two major 
effects upon the intercity bus industry. First, it has led to a 
dramatic increase in new charter firms (class III carriers). The 
effect has not been as great in the Class I category, a market 
which is dominated by market leaders, Greyhound and Trailways. 
Charter firms typically require very low start-up or capital 
costs, perhaps best explaining the great increase of new firms in 
this section of the bus market. Greyhound and trailways have, 
nevertheless experienced a decline in their respective market 
shares (Figure 1). 
The BRRA has also led to a move on the part of Greyhound and 
Trailways to "rationalize route structures."g In other words, 
these firms have taken advantage of the exit allowances and have 
effectively restructured routes as consistent with profit 
Figure 1 
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maximization. This has led to elimination of many unprofitable 
routes. Between passage of the Act in September 1982 and 
september 1983, a total of 1294 service points had been, or were 
proposed to be, dropped. Sixty percent of these service points 
did not have convenient access to a large urban area. 10 This 
lack of service would leave a little over one million people, in 
a sense, stranded (although taxi service is a viable yet very 
expensive alternative form of transportation). 
This route abandonment was not unique to deregulation, in 
fact it began in the late 1970's· when the I.C.C. began to relax 
certain market restrictions. Between 1975 and 1984, total bus 
service declined steadily with an average annual rate of 
abandonment of 4.8 percent (Figure 2). Declines in departures, 
nevertheless, reached their peak in the year following 
deregulation with a rate of 16 percent, 330 percent higher than 
the average. In the following year, the drop in departures fell 
to 4 percent. Furthermore, the Department of Transportation 
concluded that: 
In seven years prior to passage of the Act, not only 
did the number [of] terminations outnumber service 
initiations (by about 3.8 · to 1), but the number of 
communities losing part of their service was greater 
than thIlnumber gaining service (by a factor of 3.1 
to 1). 
After passage of the act this rate of termination more than 
doubled with a ratio of 8.6 to 1. If nothing else, this evidence 
indicates that regulation was preventing some carriers from 
withdrawing from certain routes, and thus preventing profit 
maximization. The Department of Transportation believes that 
deregulation has had a relatively minimal effect overall, while 
Figure 2 
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it has facilitated a tendency toward greater market efficiency: 
In sum, while there have certainly been service 
losses following passage of the Bus Act, the change 
in regulatory environment is not necessarily to 
blame. The trend of declining service was well 
underway prior to 1982. At most the Bus Act may 
have permitted a rapid adjustmentl~o the level of 
service the market could support. 
With an understanding of the development of the intercity 
bus industry we turn to a more quantitative appraisal. In the 
next section we see how regulatory policy has helped shape the 
current structure of the industry. 
III structure of the Intercity Bus Industry 
It is the purpose of this section to describe the structure 
of the intercity bus industry. We will examine the particular 
trends in market density and determine whether the degree of high 
concentration that exists in the industry is justified by scale 
economies. We begin this section with a general overview of the 
industry. 
The intercity bus industry is dominated by two vertically 
integrated firms, Greyhound and Trailways. Michael Redisch of 
the ICC describes this relationship as a "lopsided duopoly.,,13 
Both of these firms are responsible for the manufacture of their 
own buses, which aids in the reduction of value added costs. 
Greyhound alone is responsible for approximately 50 percent of 
total operating revenues for all carriers, while Trailways and a 
competitive fringe composed of commuter, charter and special 
operation services account for the remaining 50 percent. In 
order to understand the current industrial structure, one must 
first look at its origins. 
The late 1920's marked a time in the bus industry when 
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mergers ran rampant. Although, restrictions were placed on firm 
entry, the government allowed and even supported consolidation 
.throughout the industry. The government justified this position 
by equating firm size with financial stability. It was during 
this period that the Greyhound Company emerged the dominant firm 
in the industry. 
In an attempt to become competitive with Greyhound, a group 
of small companies united to form the National Trailways Bus 
System (NTBS). Most of the members of the NTB~ were also tied 
into rail travel, which by law restricted any sort of 
transportation merger, thus, membership was voluntary. The 
members of the NTBS nevertheless enjoyed many of the benefits 
that are typically attained through horizontal merger. They 
shared economies of scale through joint marketing and advertising 
ventures. They also shared terminals, which greatly increased 
route networks. Most importantly the NTBS facilitated the 
exchange of buses for long haul trips which allowed the passenger 
to remain on the same vehicle even when passing from one 
company's route to another. This enabled the NTBS to be a viable 
competitor with Greyhound for cross country travel. 
After passage of the Motor Carrier Act in 1935, the 
structure of the bus industry effectively remained frozen, with 
internal consolidations increasing the market concentration. 
Entry was severely limited until the late 1970's: 
Between 1960 and 1970, the Commission [ICC] received 
only 121 contested applications for new authority, and 
denied 36 percent of the (55) regular route, 44 
percent of the (27) charter requests, 39 percent of 
the (33) special operations rI~ests, and 67 percent 
of the (6) contract requests. 
page 16 
The Interstate Commerce Commission began to relax its entry 
restrictions in 1975, however there still existed a policy of 
protectionism for the two market leaders, Greyhound and 
Trailways. Between 1975 and 1977 the commission approved 87.5 
percent of their applications for expansion while only approving 
33 percent of those submitted by smaller carriers. This trend 
toward increased leniency on the part of the ICC can be seen by 
glancing over the growth patterns in the number of bus companies 
prior to deregulation (Figure 3). From 1975 up through 1982 
there was a steady increase in the number of operating bus 
companies in the industry. As we will see shortly, this has led 
to a decline in the concentration ratio for the industry. 
With the institution of deregulation in late 1982, Congress 
in essence lowered federal entry barriers. The ICC writes, 
••• actual and potential competition, rather than 
regulatory decree, are now to be the primary 
determina~~s of fare and service levels in the 
industry. 
The effect this had on the bus industry is quite apparent in the 
sharp increase of firms between 1982 and 1984. Between passage 
of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act in october 1982 and October of 
the following year, 54 percent of the applications for operation 
along select routes were from new carriers. 
Concentration 
Although deregulation has had a significant downward effect 
upon market concentration, the industry continues to demonstrate 
a high density level. Prior to deregulation, the industry 
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fluctuating around 98 percent. This highly concentrated state is 
primarily the result of the state and federal regulatory 
practices that placed constraints on entry by new firms. 
Furthermore, under regulation the existing firms were limited to 
expansion via merger and acquisition. This has led to a 
condition of duopoly in most long haul markets, and even monopoly 
in many light density and short haul markets. 
The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 ended over fifty years 
of regulation which effectively froze the industry in the midst 
of its evolution. If nothing else, this act has had a very 
noticeable effect upon the concentration of the industry. I have 
compiled a graph of the two-firm concentration ratios for the 
last six years, reproduced here from figure 1: 
~. ~ -~. ) . 
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concentration remained at a relatively constant level, between 
97 and 98 percent, for the years leading up to 1982. In the year 
following deregulation, however, concentration dropped over 7 
percent to 90.4 percent. Although this figure continues to 
gradually decline, it is quite clear that a very high degree of 
concentration still exists. 
In an attempt to better ascertain the nature of this 
industry we must examine whether factors other than regulatory 
decree have attributed to the high level of market concentration. 
since there are very low technological barriers to entry in the 
intercity bus industry, we can assume that this is not a factor 
substantiating the level of concentration. Similarly, no one 
carrier exhibits a superior level of innovation or efficiency. 
It is for these reasons that we must look at the cost structure 
of these firms to determine whether the level of concentration 
can be explained by economies of scale. 
If scale economies were inherent in the intercity bus 
industry a firm might increase its capacity in order to move 
lower along its average cost curve. Therefore, up to a certain 
point, the largest firm could dominate the market by charging a 
lower price and selling more output than its competitors. If 
significant scale economies do exist in this industry the best 
way for the government to maximize consumer benefit is to 
establish a monopoly where price would be federally regulated. 
A monopoly can be justified if there is a significant 
decline in average and marginal costs as the quantity of service 
increases. In most regulated monopolies, fixed costs have a 
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greater effect on average total costs than do variable costs. 
The intercity bus industry, however, demonstrates a very high 
variable to fixed cost ratio. According to a study done by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission back in 1978, 80-90 percent ot a 
carriers expenses are variable. 16 Costs per mile actually 
increase with respect to firm size. This is explained by the 
higher labor costs that are associated with larger firm size 
(typically, there is a positive relationship between the size of 
the firm and the length of its routes. Since longer routes demand 
higher wages by drivers, larger firms incur higher labor costs). 
Labor costs alone, dominate over 50 percent of the total 
operating costs of Class I carriers. 17 
Furthermore, the existence of hundreds of very small 
companies indicates that fixed costs do not pose a very high 
barrier to entry. There is a very low capacity needed to start a 
firm (in a very naive sense, one only needs to buy/lease a bus) . 
Michael Redisch of the ICC confirms this notion and asserts that 
there is not necessarily an inherent advantage in a larger firm: 
••• Greyhound, with its extensive route and terminal 
network and frequent schedules, has a higher load 
factor per bus but also has higher costs per bus mile, 
with no clear cut size advantage in terms of either 
costs or profits. 18 
The existence of scale economies in the intercity bus 
industry may be justified to some degree if one takes into 
account consumer service. Increased firm size typically lends 
itself to increased route networking. Larger firms have 
interconnecting stations and are able to o~fer cross country 
service. The more extensive a route network is, the greater is 
the ease in getting from one destination to another. Implicit in 
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these advantaqes are shorter layovers, simplified ticket 
purchasing and ease in baggage checkthrouqh. Furthermore, there 
is the added advantage of advertisinq economies which invariablly 
favor the larqer firm. Althouqh these are all advantaqes 
experienced throuqh qreater firm size, they nevertheless do not 
allow a firm to move down along its lonq-run averaqe cost curve 
(an arqument could be made for scale economies in advertisinq, 
however, this accounts for a very insignificant proportion of 
costs. In 1985 advertisinq expenses explained 4.5% of total 
operating expenses.)19 
Hiqh concentration in an industry is often the result of 
economies of scale. In the intercity bus industry, however, this 
does not appear to be the case. A number of studies have 
examined this question, however: 
The utilization of sophisticated econometric 
techniques has not revealed statisti~8llysiqnificant 
scale economies in the bus industry. 
This finding is supported by Elizabeth Pinkston in The Intercity 
Bus Transportation Industry (1975), Fred Fravel in "Returns to 
Scale in the u.S. Intercity bus Industry" (1978), Fravel, Helen 
Tauchen and Gorman Gilbert in Economies of Scale in the u.S. 
Intercity Bus Industry (1980), and Tauchen, Fravel and Gilbert in 
"Cost Structure of the Intercity Bus Industry" (1983). 
Furthermore, the actual passaqe of the BRRA, which granted firms 
greater pricinq freedom and more lenient entry and exit policies 
did not attempt to help or hinder a size class of firms. 
Therefore: 
••• Congress has implicitly concluded that significant 
scale economies and other non-re~!atory entry 
barriers do not exist for buses. 
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The Demand facing Intercity Bus Service 
With sufficient background as to the supply side of the 
industry, we now turn to a brief examination of demand. There 
are a number of factors which demonstrate an effect upon the 
demand for bus service. Clearly, fare level$ are one of the most 
significant determinants. A fare increase, (as one would expect 
in most cases) leads to a decrease in the level of quantity 
demanded. Furthermore, prices of substitute modes, in theory, 
demonstrate a noticeable effect upon demand (a qualification is 
made-here because this theory is tested in a later part of this 
paper). Consumer preferences are also an important determinant 
of demand, however, do to its subjective nature, it is more 
difficult to quantify. numerous factors which are relevant. The 
flexibility of service in some instances can be more important 
than price, as is the case with most business travelers, 
In choosing a mode of travel, the passenger considers 
not only the fares, but also other factors such as the 
time spent i~2transit, [and] the opportunity cost of 
that time ••• 
Another important factor determining demand is the geographic 
proximity of terminals to population hubs. If a firm can offer 
an extensive route network, servicing numerous intermediary 
destinations, then the particular carrier will be all the more 
attractive to the consumer. Other factors determining a 
consumer's preference are the level of comfort and safety offered 
by a particular carrier, and the seating and luggage capacity, 
which help in determining a carrier's load factor. 
The intercity bus industry has a very distinct composition 
of travelers. Congress stated that a bus system n ••• is vital to 
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the transportation needs of the elderly, handicapped, and the 
poor.,,23 Bus travelers typically have lower than national 
average incomes and a large percentage of them are residents of 
small communities and rural areas. Young people, senior 
citizens, students, members of the armed services, women and 
minorities have a disproportionately high representation in this 
market · than as compared with national percentages • 
. In my research on the bus industry I was unable to locate 
any formal assessments 'of the price-elasticity of the demand for 
bus service. In theory, however, travelers from small 
communities and rural areas would tend to be price-inelastic. 
This is explained because there does not exist a feasible 
transportation alternative to bus service apart from the 
automobile. students and senior citizens, on the other hand, 
will generally be more sensitive to price due to their 
characteristically low income levels. When one takes into 
account that discounts and special scheduling are frequently 
offered to the more price-sensitive demanders- senior citizens, 
military personnel and students (discounts are usually offered to 
students at peak transport periods like vacation breaks from 
school) then one would expect the remaining demanders to be 
relatively price-inelastic. The ICC implies a degree of 
inelasticity in their report on the intercity bus industry, 
Unlike motor carriers of property, ••• bus passengers 
were too fragmented to mount serious opposition to bus 
industry proposals for general fare increases. 24 
Furthermore, in an attempt to recover lost revenues during the 
recession, many carriers raised fares. Speaking before Congress, 
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the chairman of the ICC confirms this notion, 
fare increases have also occurred on certain routes as 
the industry struggles to overcome its generally 
weakened f!gancial condition resulting from the recent 
recession. 
Assuming the management of these firms understood the nature of 
the demand function facing bus service, this quote suggests that 
a price rise would lead to an increase in revenues. This is 
further evidence that the demand for intercity bus service is 
relatively inelastic. We examine this hypothesis empirically in 
section v. 
Profitability 
So far, we have discussed market structure in terms of 
concentration and the nature of the demand function facing the 
intercity bus market. Next, we examine market performance as 
revealed by the industry's profitablity. profitability in the 
transportation sector is commonly measured by a ratio of 
operating expenses to operating revenues. This is aptly called 
the operating ratio. As this ratio approaches one, the level of 
profit in the industry nears zero, the industrial 'breakeven 
point'. When the ratio is less than one the industry is said to 
be earning positive profits. with this in mind, the operating 
ratio for the intercity bus industry in 1970 was 90.1 percent. 
By 1984 this figure had risen to 98.3 percent, demonstrating that 
the industry has become less profitable (Figure 4). 
Factors Attributable to Industrial Decline 
I have compiled a number of explanations for this declining 
profitability. One factor is the decrease in a subsidiary 
Figure 4 
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operation, outside that of passenger service- package express. 
Prior to the introduction of such companies as Federal Express, 
Flying Tigers and the U.S. Post Office's Overnight Express, the 
intercity bus industry enjoyed considerable profits in this 
market. Experts suggest that with the introduction of these new 
competitors, there has been a drop in the profitablity of this 
sector, since the early 1970's. This, however, only explains 
fourteen percent of the industry's total operating revenues. 
Another factor which has contributed to the decline ' in the 
profitability of the class I carriers (especially Greyhound and 
Trailways) is the rise of charter bus service. The Bus 
Regulatory Reform Act had a tremendous impact on the growth of 
charter buses, " ••• which require very low start-up or capital 
costs. 1126 Resse Taylor, chairman of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, stated ·on September 25, 1984, before the Subcommittee 
on Surface Transportation, 
More than 2400 charter applications have been 
received, and it appears th~1 more than half have been 
from first-time applicants. 
The growth in this particular market has resulted in increased 
intramodal competition throughout the industry. Charter bus 
companies can be considered parasitic competitors, because they 
have the flexibility of entering routes during peak demand and 
exiting those same routes as soon as demand begins to wane. 
Charter buses also have the ability to insure close to full 
capacity, because their frequency of service is contingent upon 
peaks in demand. With the rise in competition within this sector 
o£ the market, fares have dropped considerably, to the point 
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where most firms are operating with borderline profitability. The 
net result of the influx of charter services is an increase in 
competitive forces both intercharterly and extracharterly which 
has had a negative effect upon regular route fares. 
Some officials at the ICC have attributed part of the 
decline in carrier profitability to increasing insurance costs, 
which have effectively raised costs across the whole bus 
industry. It is unclear whether ~he increase in operating costs 
was passed directly to the consumer in terms of higher fares, or 
was absorbed in toto by the carrier. If the costs were levied on 
the consumer, one would expect a drop in the quantity of service 
demanded. If the carrier were to assume all of the costs, this would 
reduce net revenues and consequently profits. Most likely, firms 
implemented a combination of the two alternatives, which would 
have nevertheless resulted in a reduction in carriers' profits. 
Evidence suggests, however, that the rise in insurance costs have 
not had a very significant effect upon industry profits. I have 
compiled data on insurance expenditures for the years 1970-85, 
obtained from the American Bus Association (see Figure 5). After 
converting the figures to real terms, there does not appear to 
have been a significant increase, nor a consistent increase in 
insurance expenditures. FUrthermore, a comparison of insurance 
and safety expenditures to total expenditures accounts for only 
3-5 percent of total costs. 
The strike at Greyhound in late 1983 and early 1984 also had 
a negative effect on industry profitability. During this three 
month period Greyhound was unable to offer intercity service. 
The effects on profits are somewhat skewed, however. Although 
Figure 5 
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Greyhound suffered financial losses during this period, other 
carriers such as Trailways and Carolina Coach benefited by a 
dramatic increase in their demand. Although this did not 
entirely off-set Greyhound's losses, the industry was only 
marginally affected. An additional factor contributing to the 
decline in the profitability of the bus industry was the 
recession in the early 1980's. Reese Taylor confirms the effects 
of the recession: 
The bus industry did not fare well during the recent 
recession. However, even though the improving economy 
and passage of the Bus Act have not yet reversed 
declining ridership and earnings, the effects of the 
recession would have been more severe without the 
reforms included in the act •••• [The bus industry is] 
the only transportation industry that has nO~8shown 
marked improvement as the economy improves. 
This last statement is supported by the sharp decline in the 
industry's operating ratio after 1981 (refer to Figure 4). As 
previously mentioned, many carriers attempted to regain losses, 
incurred during the recession, by raising fares. Nevertheless, 
the industry's profitablity continued to slip. 
Finally, the last and, I argue, most significant factor 
leading to the decline in the intercity bus industry's 
profitability can be attributable to increasing intermodal 
competition with airlines. Intermodal competition among public 
carriers first started becoming significant around 1950, however: 
.•• intercity bus firms have not participated at all in 
the si~~ificant growth in total intercity travel since 
1950." 
From 1950 to 1982, the bus industry experienced a 2.8 percent 
decline in market share when compared with all intercity transport 
modes. The automobile, although private, has decreased 
approximately 3.5 percent, rail travel has shown a considerable 
page 27 
decrease of 5.8 percent, and air travel has made up the 
difference with an 11.2 percent increase in market share. 30 
These results' alone indicate that the intercity bus industry has 
lost some of its market to the airline industry. In the 
following section we develop this relationship further. 
IV Evidence for Market Link between Air and Bus Travel 
Lack of Intramo~al competition 
The absence of intramodal competition in the intercity bus 
industry, offers evidence that this market is linked to the 
airline industry. In 1975, Elizabeth Pinkston concluded that in 
the bus industry, the number of carriers in any particular market 
has no significant effect upon bus fares. Thus, competitive 
factors do not appear to exist intramodally. Furthermore, the 
antitrust immunity which existed under regulation continues to 
exist today as one of the tenets in the Bus Regulatory Reform 
Act. This, in essence, permits collective discussion of fares 
between firms. In the year following deregulation in late 1983, the 
major carriers assembled and formed an Ad Hoc committee 
responsible for, among 'other things, establishing general fares. 
One major result of this committee was to 
••• replace the $99 maximum one way fare that had been 
in effect for ov!~ one year with a series of new zones 
peaking at $149. 
In addition, the committee agreed upon a ten percent hike in 
interstate fares. It has always been Congress's objective to 
insure consumer protection. Therefore, such antitrust immunity 
could only be justified by the existence of competitive forces 
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outside of the bus industry. 
As stated earlier, this external competition from airlines 
began to arise around 1950. It was not until the 1970's, 
-
however, that bus firms began to drop their fares along routes 
with which competition with airlines formally existed. One 
example of firms' reaction to this intermodal competition was a 
travel package offered by the major carriers in 1976, which 
included unlimited travel for a specified number of days. This 
marked an attempt at meeting the increased competition with 
airlines on long hauls. In addition, 
bus firms also introduced round trip excursion fares 
in markets with significant air competition. These 
were priced at Ie!! than one-half the round-trip air 
night coach fare. 
Furthermore, although the structure of the bus industry is quite 
conducive to monopolization, based on its high concentration and 
antitrust immunity, firms still find it necessary to offer 
discounts and incentives to its most frequent patrons. This 
suggests that competitive forces which fail to exist intramodally 
are most likely to be present intermodally. 
The oil Price Shock of 1979-80 
If we hypothesized about the effect that the oil shock of 
1979 and 1980 had upon the intercity bus industry's 
profitability, one would have expected a decrease in profit 
attributable to the dramatic increase in the price of one of the 
industry's factor inputs, gasoline. Examination of the actual 
data, however, does not reveal an adverse effect upon the 
financial status of the industry. In fact, evidence supports 
just the opposite conclusion. Between the years 1979 and 1980, 
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when the oil price shock reached its peak, the industry's 
profitability actually rose significantly from its declining rate 
the period before. If the operating ratio for the airline 
industry is examined during this same period, one notes quite the 
opposite result; namely, domestic airline profitability declined. 
This evidence suggests a possible shift in demand away from air 
travel tciwards bus travel. At this point, we have only compared 
relative profitabilities of the two industries. In order to 
pursue this proposed transference of demand further, we must 
compare changes in the quantity of service between these two 
industries. 
I have compiled two graphs depicting the change in quantity 
of travel for the air and bus industries between the years 1975 
and 1984 (Figures 6 and 7 r~spectively). The units of 
measurement for air travel are revenue passenger miles and the 
units for bus travel are passenger miles. The difference in 
units is due to inaccessibility of data, however, both passenger 
miles and revenue passenger miles give accurate indications of 
fluctuations in quantity of service. Our interest here is not in 
co~paring actual quantity of service but changes in service. The 
bars depicted are not quantity totals for each year, but rather 
differences between years. Therefore, a negative value indicates 
a decline in service from period A to period B. In short, the 
sign and magnitude of the values indicate the slope for the 
change in quantity. 
with this in mind~ we now turn to the evidence cited in the 
graphs. The period of interest in this discussion is the 1979-80 
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rocketed. As we shall see later in section VII, there existed an 
extreme escalation of air fares during this period, most likely 
explained by the increase in the price of jet fuel. Based on 
simple price theory one would expect the quantity of air service 
to decline. The evidence in Figure 6 confirms this, marking the 
most significant decrease in revenue passenger miles for the 
1970-85 period. If we examine the bus industry (Figure 7), 
however, just the opposite effect is observed. The quantity of 
bus service not only increased during this period but actually 
reached its peak for the years 1970-85. The author would suggest 
that it is not coincidental that the airlines experienced their 
worst loss in travelers while buses experienced their greatest 
gain. 
Th~ increase in bus passenger miles would seem to imply that 
bus fares did not increase as drastically as air fares. Indeed, 
bus fares did not appear to be strongly effected by the price 
shock, whatsoever. The differences in the effects can be 
explained by the relative fuel efficiencies of the two 
industries. This is demonstrated in the following table: 30 
__________________ ~p~a=s=s~e=n~q7.e~r Miles per Gallon of Motor :Fu==e=l~ __ __ _____ year ________________________________________ ___ 
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 
Intercity Buses 133 140 141 146 141 
Airlines 15 18 20 23 24 
G~ven a single gallon of motor fuel, buses are able to provide on 
average, seven times more passenger miles than airplanes. 
Furthermore, buses do not use nearly as much fuel per trip as do 
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airplanes. Consequently, fuel costs have a much greater effect 
upon price in the air industry than in the bus industry. 
The oil price shock of 1979-80 provides an ideal opportunity 
to witness a temporary shift in the demand curves facing air and 
bus travel. The movement of these curves suggests a strong link 
between these two markets. This notion will be more rigorously 
tested later in section VII. with sufficient evidence linking 
the intercity bus industry to the air travel market, we turn to a 
brief discussion of the Airline Industry. 
V The Airline Industry 
It is the purpose of this section to briefly examine the 
nature of the airline industry with particular emphasis upon the 
internal effects of the Airline Deregulation Act. It is 
important to acknowledge that those policy changes that have 
effectively changed the internal structure of the airline 
industry have also created spillover effects, which have effected 
other industries. There is, ther~fore, an underlying assumption 
that deregulation, although exogenous to the bus travel, has 
levied an effect upon the intercity bus industry. This assumption 
will be more thoroughly tested in section VII. This section 
begins with a brief historical sketch of the airline industry and 
follows with a description of those governmental restraints that 
kept the industry regulated. We conclude with an analysis of the 
effects that deregulation has had in the airline industry. 
A. Air Transport:The Regulatory years 
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The airline industry entered the commercial arena a little 
over fifty years ago as an efficient means of mail transport. In 
those days most people traveled by train or automobile. The 
postmaster general was particularly inspired by the potential of 
air travel and went so far as to meet with the airline owners to 
agree upon designated air routes for each airline. Although this 
system was to benefit the consumer eventually by facilitating 
convenient travel, the postmaster's methods of setting contracts 
were seen as anti-competitive. This resulted in the first form of 
airline regulation, the Airmail Act of 1934. This act was 
intended to maintain a competitive structure within this industry 
by mandating that sealed bids be given for airmail contracts for 
any given route. Inspired in part by the growth of the industry 
and the bidding procedures, price wars began to emerge: 
The bidding for mail contracts became so intense that 
in 1938 Eastern offered to delives4themail between Houston and San Antonio for free. 
In that same year, congress approved the civil Aeronautics 
Act of 1938 which set up the Civil Aeronautics Authority. This 
agency, which in two years was to be renamed the Civil 
Aeronautics Board, was responsible for the implementat'ion of all 
of the regulatory constraints imposed upon the airline industry. 
Regulation was perceived as a means of avoiding "wasteful 
duplication of capital" by many competitors, when only a few were 
thought to be necessary to meet the demand. At the same time, it 
would be the responsibility of the civil Aeronautics Authority to 
regulate prices so that monopoly profits would not ensue. 
Federal regulation of the airline industry, not unlike that 
of the bus industry, arose in the wake of financial instability 
" 
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as the government attempted to prevent a second 'Great 
Depression'. Even though passenger travel was rapidly 
increasing, the fare wars that emerged from the growing 
competition resulted in declining revenues for many carriers. As 
competition intensified, the prospect of wi4espread bankruptcy 
inspired Congress to act. Furthermore, there were a number of 
fatal plane crashes in the early 1930's, which prompted Congress 
to set up an authority that would both execute safety precautions 
and monitor the industry's economic status. 
. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) sought to protect existing 
carriers by restricting entry. In all the years the industry was 
regulated, there were 79 attempts to establish new major 
airlines- all were refused. Meanwhile, "mergers and acquisitions 
reduced the number of major carriers from 16 to 10.,,35 
Regulation, essentially, diverted competition from price to 
service. Congress hoped such competition would promote increased 
safety throughout the industry. Although this end was achieved, 
most of the competition was directed at advertising and flight 
amenities, such as in-flight meals or seating. 
In the early postwar years, the CAB set air fares according 
to the dominant mode of transport, rail (for first class rates). 
This rate setting was flawed in that air costs, unlike that for 
rail, drop considerably over distance. ThUS, long haul air trips 
were far more profitable than short haul. Years later, the board 
began setting fares based on distance. ·It was not until 1969, 
however, that the board was able to settle on a definitive system 
by which to set fares for all markets. The system, entitled 
Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation (DPFI), was based on 
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industry average costs and varied according to distance. 
Opponents of the DPFI, however, argued that the system 
established fares that were substantially different from the cost 
of service in most markets. Furthermore, factors such as market 
density, (which tended to reduce average cost as density 
increased) were not factored into the rate scale. As inefficient 
as the DPFI was, firms were allowed some pricing freedom. They 
were permitted to set fares as high as 30 percent over the DPFI 
and were allowed to offer discounts not exceeding 25 percent of 
the set fare. 36 
Beginning in the early 1970's, a wave of deregulatory fervor 
began to sweep the nation. Industries such as banking, trucking, 
and telephone were under careful observation. A number of 
economists began to reexamine the benefits and losses associated 
with airline regulation. Many argued that regulation kept prices 
artificially high. In 1974, at the start of President Ford's 
administration, rampant inflation inspired Congress to initiate a 
study of inflationary forces within the federal government. It 
was generally believed that the artificial price levels in the 
airline industry contributed to this effect. Therefore, in 
October of that same year, the National Commission on Regulatory 
Reform was established to eliminate "federal regulations that 
increased costs to the consumer.,,37 Abolishment of airline 
regulation, was not certain, however, until President Carter 
appointed Alfred Kahn, staunch opponent of regulation, to act as 
chair of ~he CAB. 
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Deregulation and its Effects 
The Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) was passed in late 
October, 1978. This act essentially removed the controls that 
the CAB had on entry and fares. The most immediate effect that 
resulted was an increase in the intensity of competition arising 
from new entrants: 
Between May 1978 and May 1981 the Herfindahl index of 
concentration did not increase in any category of 
market and fell in most categories •••• Specifically, 
69 percent of the 100 most heavily tr~xeled markets 
were entered by one or more airlines. 
Furthermore, the number of operating certified airlines almost 
tripled between 1978 and 1984 increasing from 44 to 114. 39 This 
consequently resulted in a decline in the market shares of the 
pre-existing carriers. 
The influx of new competitors led to a re-structuring of 
airline costs. New firms like People Express were not 
constrained to union contracts as were the established carriers. 
In fact, in 1982 forty percent of the formerly regulated 
carriers' expenses were labor, while labor for People Express was 
only twenty percent of total expenses. 40 Many of the new 
carriers reduced labor costs by replacing the three man cockpit 
with only two men. In addition, the established carriers, like 
United and Eastern, were tied to labor contracts which stipulated 
that pilots work a maximum of 50 hours a month. pilots employed 
by new entrants, having no labor constraints, . averaged seventy-
five hours per month, (fifty percent more than incumbent firms). 
In an attempt to become competitive with the new entrants, the 
pre-deregulation carriers were forced to reduce labor costs. 
Between 1978 and 1984, employee compensations such as pension and 
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insurance benefits, declined 6 percent. 4l Cross utilization of 
employees further reduced costs. For instance, employees that 
were once solely responsible for baggage handling, became 
responsible for loading in-flight meals or even checking 
passengers through at gates. 
costs in many instances were further reduced at the 
sacrifice of service quality. Fewer in-flight amenities were 
offered to passengers. Furthermore, in order to increase load 
factors (i.e. the number of passengers per plane), more seats 
were installed in planes, thereby raising seating density. New 
entrants also demanded more flying hours per day from each plane. 
with these cost reductions, new entrants were enabled to set 
fares lower than the pre-existing carriers. In an attempt to 
become more competitive with these low-cost airlines, all 
carriers were forced to become more efficient. This whole 
process forced fares to become more aligned with costs. 
This has lead to one of the most visible effects of 
deregulation, the reduction of fares. The General Accounting 
Office conducted a study in which fares were compared before and 
after deregulation. The GAO concluded that after inflation was 
taken into account, fares fell by 6 percent between 1978 and 
1984. 42 This study, however, did not take into account the wide 
range of discounted fares that are available. James ott, in an 
article in Aviation Week and Space Technology, claimed that price 
differentials have rea~hed the magnitude of 70 percent for the 
same flight. 43 Business fares are often used to subsidize lower 
discretionary (i.e. more price-elastic) flyers, which explains 
some of this variance. According to Harrison Donnelly in the 
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October 24, 1986 edition of Editorial Research Reports, 91 
percent of current travelers pay fares below the standard coach 
rate. Donnelly concluded that, "On average, discounts have 
reduced fares by 63 percent.,,44 The Brookings Institution 
conducted another s~udy that demonstrated that deregulation has 
led to fare savings of up to 35 percent for flights between 2500 
and 3000 miles. 
As a result of the lower air fares, the quantity of air 
travel demanded has increased. Melvin Brenner, airline industry 
analyst, confirms this notion (1983): 
significantly, in the last four years the North 
Atlantic industry load factor averaged 68 percent- an 
extraordinarily high level for a four-year average for 
an entire geographic region. Nevertheless, the 
industry was ~lagued in that region by price wars and 
discounting. 4!) 
Airline deregulation has also led to an increase in 
convenience for the consumer with regard to stopovers. Before 
deregulation, the CAB's authority over routes allowed it full 
control over entry into industry and its submarketso The board 
kept the industry unnaturally (in retrospect) concentrated, 
allowing only two or three firms in a given market. certain 
airlines were restricted to servicing regional markets while only 
larger airlines, the trunks, were allowed to service major long-
haul markets. Consequently, regional and market specialization 
developed. One effect this had was to decrease consumer welfare 
for those travelers that were forced to change airlines enroute, 
because there was no on-line connection. The facilitation of on-
line connections was one result of deregulation. This had the 
effect of: 1. reducing chance of lost baggage and 2. increasing 
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consumer convenience (the consumer no longer has to leave the 
plane to locate a connecting flight). A study by Graham, Kaplan 
and Sibley concluded that deregulation has increased passenger 
convenience: 
An analysis of travel patterns in a sample of more 
than 4000 markets shows that the fraction of trips 
that require passengers to change planes has remained 
about the same since 1978, but the proportion of 
passengers that must cha2~e airlines in route has 
decrea~ed by 38 percent. 
There are a number of conclusions one can derive from the 
events following airline deregulation. Free market mechanisms 
seem to have forced fares to fall more closely in line with 
costs. The variations in pricing across submarkets appear to be 
the result of the distance and time sensitlvity of passengers, 
"in ways which are broadly consistent with market efficiency 
criteria." 47 Furthermore, the increase in load factors since 
deregulation suggests that more efficient utilization of capital 
has ensued. Finally, the trimming of excess costs, necessitated 
in order to compete with new "no-frills" competitors, has forced 
the airline indust.ry to become far more efficient than it had 
been under regulation. 
VI Comparison of the Demand Demographics between Bus and Air Travel 
In this section we compare the differences and similarities 
between the demand demographics facing the airline and intercity 
bus industries. This section is important in determining to what 
extent these two markets are viable substitutes. Buses 
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characteristically dominate the intercity transportation industry 
with respect to the number of passenqer trips per mode. In 1982, 
for instance, buses were respon~ible for 390 million trips while 
airlines accrued a total of 275.8 million. 48 Furthermore, buses 
are also responsible for carryinq the qreatest number of 
passenqers a year. In 1981, buses carried 375 million 
passenqers, whereas airlines were responsible for 276.8 million 
and Amtrak, only 20.6" million. When comparinq distance traveled, 
airlines clearly dominate interci~y travel. Airlines accumulated 
202.1 billion passenger miles in 1981, followed by buses at 26.9 
billion and Amtrak at 4.8 billion. 49 
The Data used in this section was compiled from the National 
Travel Survey, li11 Census Q! Transportation. I investigated 
extensively in search of a more recent study, however, officials 
at the Bureau of the Census claimed that due to financial 
constraints, future statistical compilations of this variety have 
been discontinued. Although these statistics are already nine 
years old, a report published in 1984 which utilized some of the 
data claimed, 
••• most of the bus companies we con~acted confirmed that 
the characteristics of their bus ~5ssenqers have not 
changed significantly since 1977. 
Based on this finding I make the same assumption for air 
passengers. Lastly, the Census of Transportation study surveys 
"non-local trips" which is defined as trips in excess of 100 
miles in length. This would tend to exclude commuters from the 
study, thus the data offers a viable assessment of intercity 
travel. 
When comparing the family income levels of travelers, there 
· Figure 8 
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appears to be a large differential between those that choose 
between air and bus transport. This evidence is supported by the 
following table: 
Income Classification of Intercity Travelers by Mode in 1977 
(percent of person-trips) 
Family Income Bus Air Auto* Auto** Rail Total Bus-Air 
.1 
Under $5000 19.3 4.8 6.4 4.6 9.9 6 . 5 14.5 
$5000 to $7499 12.2 3 . 9 6.2 4.9 6.5 6.1 8.3 
$ 7500 to $ 9999. 8.4 _ !2 Q 6.1 7.2 5 . 4 6.2 3.4 
$10000 to $14999 20.4 14.7 21.6 23.7 15 . 3 20 . 6 5.7 
$15000 to $19999 ~ 13.8 19.7 19.5 13.5 18.8 
1.5 
$20000 to $24999 - 0.9 16.2 15.9 17 .9 13 . 5 15.8 -5.3 
$25000 to $49999 12.0 33.9 21.1 19.9 30 . 5 22 . 4 -21. 9 
$50000 and over 1.4 7.7 3.0 2.3 5 . 4 3.5 -6.3 
"1~. " 
Note: Columns in table may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding. 
* Auto/truck trips without camping equipment. 
** Auto/truck trips with camping equipment. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the c'ensus, 1977 Census of 
Transportation. National Travel Survey, Report TC77-N-2, Tables 3G,3E,3I. 
In order to illucidate this point further, I have compiled two 
graphs representing the choice of mode according to family 
income. Figure 8 demonst~ates that travelers with a family 
income below $10,000 have a greater propensity to choose bus 
travel over the other two means of public transportation. In 
Figure 9 we note just the opposite effect as income exceeds 
$19,999. In this income range air travel clearly dominates 
consumer choice over bus service by 25.5 percent. Within the bus 
industry, more than 60 percent of the travels have below median 
income of $16,009, whereas in the airline, industry , more than 60 
percent of the travelers have income above the median level. 
This evidence suggests that as travelers' income level grows, 
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there is a greater tendency to substitute air service for bus 
service. 
It is important to note that since airline deregulation, 
changes in the fare structure in the airline industry have made 
air travel more affordable to low income groups. since this data 
was compiled in 1977, the year before deregulation, it is likely 
that certain airline demographics have noticeably changed in 
favor of an increased number of low income travelers. 
When comparing the age distribution of travelers with 
respect to transport mode, one notices a divergence between bus 
and air passengers (Figures 10 and 11). Passengers under the age 
of twenty-five compose 47.1 percent of the total bus travelers. 
In the airline industry, this age group only comprises 16.6 
percent of total travelers. The middle age group, between 25 and 
64, explain approximately 76 percent of airline passengers while 
representing only 36 percent of the bus travelers. Finally, 16.4 
percent of bus passengers are sixty-five years or older, as 
compared with 6.8 percent for airlines. These results are 
demonstrated graphically on the following page. 5l 
One may notice that these pie charts (Figures 10 and 11» 
are conspicuously similar to those on the previous page (Figures 
8 and 9). This is attributable to the fact that income and age 
are not mutually exclusive. The majority of ai~line passengers 
lie between the ages 25 and 64, which include a large portion of 
business travelers and professionals who undoubtedly have higher 
than median incomes. Conversely, the majority of bus 
passengers are either below the age 25 or above the age 64. These 
patrons comprise the lower income sector of the population. 
Figure 10 
kJe Distribution of Passengers by Mode 
PASSENGERS UNDER 25 JHl evER M 
Figure 11 
Age Distribution of Passengers by Mode 
PASSENlERS BE1WEEN lHE AGES 25 AN) 64 
a,. (51.~) 
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Furthermore, there appears to be a significant difference in the 
sex of air and bus passengers. sixty-one percent of bus 
passengers are female, as compared with 36.9 percent for 
airlines. One can argue that sex, too, is correlated with 
income. For example, in 1977 the median income for male workers 
per week was $253 while that for females was only $156. 52 Based 
on these results the greatest substitution between air and bus 
travel would occur between the income and age margins. This 
would mean that competition between the two industries is 
strongest for passengers within the annual income range of 
$10,000 and $20,000 (I calculated estimates for 1985 to be 
between $11,200 and $22,400), and passengers within the age 
ranges of 18 to ~4 years and 55 to 64 years. 
We conclude this section with an examination of the distance 
substitution between air and bus travelers. For the intercity 
bus industry, the median trip is a little over 400 miles while 
the median for domestic air flights is well over 1,000 miles in 
length. In 1981, the average bus trip length was 72 miles while 
that for airlines was 730 miles. From these simple statistics 
alone, one is able to witness yet another clear divergence in 
demand demographics between these two industries. Bailey, 
Graham, and Kaplan identify the distance substitution between bus 
and air travel: 
As market distance increases, surface travel becomes a 
poor substitute for air travel. Since air travel is 
almost always faster, the total cost of air 
transportation will be less for individuals who place 
a high value on their time. In short-haul markets, 
where the time savings of air travel are relatively 
small, airlines tend to specialize in serving 
travelers who place a high value on time~ At longer 
market distances air travel demand be~~mes less 
sensitive to air service convenience. 
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These conclusions are supported by data from the National Travel 
Survey. I have compiled two graphs demonstrating the 
distribution of travelers with respect to distance for air and 
bus travel (Figures 12 and 13). It is clear that buses dominate 
short hauls whereas airlines pre-dominate over long hauls. 
According to the study, 71 percent of round-trip bus travel is 
less than 600 miles in length. This same distance for airplanes 
explains only 13 percent of all trips. If we compare longer 
hauls, only 17 percent of bus travel is 800 miles or greater, as 
compared with 67 percent for airplanes. The civil Aeronautics 
Board recognized airlines' competitive disadvantage in short 
hauls and consequently: 
••• the Board deliberately set fares below costs in 
markets of less than 400 miles so that air 
. transpgitation would be more competitive with surface 
modes. 
According to our results, the greatest substitution between modes 
would tend to occur at the margins, that is, somewhere between 400 
and 1000 miles (see Figure 13b). 
In this section we have examined and compared some of the 
demand demographics facing the air and bus industries. The 
results demonstrate a clear divergence between the 
characteristics of the demand for bus travel and the demand for 
air travel. These differences are not absolute, however. In 
each category there exists a considerable degree of overlap. For 
instance, while it is clear that buses cater to lower income 
travelers and airlines service those of a higher income category, 
it is not clear which mode dominates those consumers that lie in 
between these categories. It is these consumers that are of keen 
43 
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interest when comparing the substitutability between markets. In 
the following section we continue this analysis using a more 
empirical approach to determine if airline deregulation has had 
an effect upon the intercity bus industry. 
VII Analysis: Airline Deregulation - the spillover effects 
This section of my paper is dedicated to an empirical 
analysis of the competitive relationship between the air and bus 
industries. We will examine the effect that the Airline 
Deregulation Act has had upon the airline industry and then 
examine to what degree this has effected its next closest 
competitor, the intercity bus industry. 
It is my aim to test two hypotheses: 
1. Airline Deregulation has led to a fall in the price of 
air service 
2. A change in the price of air service will alter the demand 
for bus travel. 
A. Airline Deregulation and its effect upon Price 
We begin our analysis with the airline industry. Before 
Deregulation, the airline industry annually demonstrated a low 
operating ratio (operating costs/operating revenues). This is a 
very good indication that there existed a high profit level 
throughout the market. Based on economic theory, one would have 
expected these profits to have been bid away by new competitors 
as they entered the market. This did not occur, however, because 
there existed very high and, in fact, insurmountable barriers to 
entry in the form of federal regulation. Thus, theory suggests 
that 'removal of these barriers would lead to an influx of 
competitors up to the point at which economic rent can no longer 
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be earned. This would in effect shift the supply curve out to the 
right, increasing the quantity of air service and lowering its 
price (see figure 14). 
In order to test whether the empirical evidence supports 
this theory, I examine the trends in price, quantity and 
concentration beginning with 1970. In order to facilitate this 
discussion, I have compiled three graphs. The first graph, 
Figure 15, depicts the change in quantity of domestic air travel 
over time. The units for quantity are measured in revenue 
passenger miles, which is simply defined as the distance traveled 
multiplied by the number of revenue paying passengers on each 
flight. This data represents annual compilations from Air 
Carrier Traffic statistics under the category of domestic trunk 
carriers. As one can clearly see, there was a considerable 
increase in the quantity of air service between December 1977 and 
December 1979. This observation supports our hypothesis. 
Next we look at the change in airline prices over time. I 
have arbitrarily chosen the fares for two major markets over the 
period 1976-1984. These markets link Chicago-Miami, and New 
York-Miami, respectively. These prices were extracted from the 
Official Airline Guide for the months July and December during 
the 1976-1984 period. These months were chosen in conjunction 
with their common destination, Miami, in order to define a market 
that is predominantly composed of vacation travelers. This 
market specification was made in order to insure routes which 
would be most competitive with the demand demographics for 
intercity bus travelers. 
Brief inspection of both of Figures 16 and 17 yield a 
Figur e 14 
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similar trend in the movement of air fares over time. In both the 
Chicago/Miami and New York/Miami markets, prices increased at a 
relatively constant and modest rate until July 1979 (Note: it 
should be mentioned that the data collection has been limited to 
the months December and July, therefore any references made 
toward a trend from one period to the next does not mean to imply 
that the month mentioned marked the most significant change in 
price). The sudden increase in fares in July 1979 can be 
attributable to the increase in costs resulting from the 1979-
1980 oil price shock. I have included a graph charting the path 
of the price of jetfuel over time (Figure 18). The price of 
jetfuel effectively sky-rocketed, increasing 230 percent, between 
1978 and 1981. Based on this knowledge, and the fact that 
airline cost structure is largely determined by the cost , of fuel, 
one would have expected airline fares to follow in the same 
increasing trend. This expectation is refuted by the reality of 
events. In the chicago/Miami market, 'air fares plummeted between 
July and December of 1980, when fuel prices were nearing their 
peak. Similarly, in the New York/Miami market, prices fell 
remarkably between December' 1979 and December 1980. Based on the 
assumption that there would be a lag between the imposition of 
deregulation in 1978 and its consequential effects, the data 
appears to suggest a cause and effect relationship" The extreme 
decline in airline fares, contrary to the rise in the price of 
fuel, supports our initial hypothesis that airline deregulation 
has led to a decline in' the price level. 
Finally, we conclude this analysis with an examination of 
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concentration ratios by dividing the Revenue Passenger Miles for 
the top four domestic trunk carriers by the industry total 
(domestic). These statistics were obtained from annual 
publications of Air Carrier Traffic Statistics, compiled by the 
Civil Aeronautics Board for the years 1970 to 1984 (when the CAB 
was retired). Data for the year 1985 was obtained from the Air 
Transport Authority annual industry report. 
From Figure 19;~ we can see that there has been a consistent 
trend toward a less concentrated industry ever since 1970. There 
does appear, however, to be a significant drop in concentration 
after 1978, the year in which deregulation was instituted. To 
test whether this change is statistically significant, I ran a 
simple regression with 'revenue passenger miles' as the dependent 
variable, and 'concentration' as the independent variable. In 
addition, I included a dummy variable for the years following 






0 ... 0, for years 1970-1977 
0 = 1, for years 1978-1985 
= Revenue Passenger Miles 
= Four firm concentration ratio 
= Dummy variable x CONC 
The following results were obtained, 
RPM = 14.249 
(.331) 
- 4.399 CONC 
(.576) 
SER = .054 
Given the following model, 
+ .544 O*CONC 
( • 084) 
OW = 1.15 
RPM = Bo + B1CONC + B2CONC*O 
Standard Error 
we now test the hypothesis that market concentration decreased at 
a significantly faster rate than prior to airline deregulation. 
In short, we are testing whether B2 is significantly greater than 
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HO : B2 ~ 0 • 
This implies that there is either no change in slope or that the 
slope decreases. conversely, the alternative hypothesis states 
that the slope increases, 
Hl : B2 > 0 • 
From the derived t-statistic for the dummy variable (6.45), we 
reject the null hypothesis and conclude with 99% confidence that 
there has been a statistically significant drop in the level of 
concentration in the domestic airline market. It is interesting 
to note that if we switch the years of our analysis to the period 
prior to deregulation, the dummy variable assumes at-statistic 
of -6.45. 
Given our conclusions about market concentration, we now 
focus upon its impact on airline fares. For the purpose of this 
discussion we refer to an article by Graham, Kaplan and Sibley on 
the "Efficiency and Competition in the Airline Industry". This 
article, published in 1983, concluded that concentration has a 
, 
significant and positive effect on air fares (Figure 20). 
Figure 20 






Mile ($) . 135 
. 120 
. 1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0 
Herfindahl Index 
SOURCE: Graham.. D. Kapl.a:n. D. Sible-V. D. Efficiencv "!InG (;ompe-tition in ~he Air1i~ 
I:tlIjust.ry. »e11 Journsl ot Economics. Vo114. 1983. page 135. 
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Placed in the context of our current analysis this indicates 
that a significant fall in market concentration will place 
downward pressure on the price of air travel. Therefore, based 
on the evidence given above I conclude that Airline Deregulation 
has led to decline in the price level of air travel. 
Cross Substitutability of Markets 
Having completed our analysis of the airline industry, we 
now turn our attention to the intercity bus industry. It is the 
purpose of this section to examine whether the air and ~us 
markets are linked by price. In short, we are testing the 
following hypothesis: an increase (decrease) in the. price of air 
service will increase (decrease) the demand for bus travel. 
We begin our analysis by estimating the supply and demand 
. functions for the intercity bus industry. The dependent variable 
for both equations is passenger-miles which acts asa proxy for 
quantity. This data was obtained from the Interstate Commerce 
Commissions' Office of Transportation Analysis. The demand 
equation is composed of three independent varia~les, the price of 
bus service,the price of air service, and the personal 
disposable income per capita, 
OD = f(Pbus ' Pair' Y) 
The consumer price index for intercity bus travel is used as a 
proxy for the price of bus service. The consumer price index for 
transportation modes is based on the average price per mile. The 
same source is responsible for the proxy for the price of air 
travel. Data for personal disposable income per capita is in 
nominal terms and was obtained from the 1986 edition of the 
Economic Report of the President. 
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The supply equation is composed of two independent 
variables, the price of bus service, and the price of gasoline, 
QS = f(Pbus ' Pgas ) 
The Producer Price Index for gasoline was used as a proxy for the 
price of gasoline. When estimating these simultaneous equations 
we assume that the market is always in equilibrium. That is, 
Qt* = QtO = QtS 
Two-stage least-squares estimation was utilized in order to 
eliminate the correlation of the price of bus service with the 
error term. In determining the exogenous variables used for this 
analysis, I estimated both the supply and demand equations for 
the airline industry. The results of these estimations can be 
found in the appendix. The following exogenous variables are 
assumed to be uncorrelated with the error terms in both 
regressions and thus, were used as instrumental variables for 
this estimation process: personal disposable income per capita, 
the consumer price index, the producer price index for gasoline, 
and the concentration ratio for the airline industry. Personal 
disposable income is considered exogenous because economic 
changes in the bus market have a negligible effect on the economy 
as a whole. Similarly, the consumer price index accounts for so 
many factors that changes in the price level of bus service have 
a negligible effect upon this index. The intercity bus industry 
accounts for less than 1% of the gasoline consumption for motor 
vehicles in the United States, therefore changes in its demand 
for gas will have an almost imperceptible effect upon the price 
of gas. 57 
paqe 51 
Finally, the concentration ratio for the airline industry was 
used as an instrument because, in theory, chanqes in the market 
structure of the airline industry will be both external to the 
bus market and will indirectly effect the price of bus service 
throuqh the price of air. Inclusion of these exoqenous variables 
allows the two equations to be identified. 
The natural loqarithm was computed for all the variables in 
order to achieve two ends: 1. to remove the qrowth over time of 
the variance of the data and 2. to estimate elasticities of the 
independent variables by convertinq the data into homoqeneous 
units. 
Results 
The fo1lowinq are the variables used to define the model, 
Q = Total intercity bus passenqer-miles, annual 
Pbus = Consumer Price Index for intercity bus travel 
Pair = Consumer Price Index for air travel 
Y = Personal Disposable Income per capita, nominal 
G = Producer Price Index for qasoline 
Bus Demand 
loq Q = -6.664 -~oq. PbUS + .473 lO.q Pair + 1.2 loq Y 
. (70036) ~ (.317) 
SER = .045 OW = 1.61 Q = 3.26 
Frequency: Annual Period: 1970-1985 
Bus Supply 
loq Q = 3.110 
( .128) 
.0411oq Pbus + .065loq G 
(.035) (.053) 
SER =.035 OW =2.04 Q =3.26 
Frequency: Annual Period: 1970-1985 
( • 869) 
SE 
Between these two reqressions, the one of particular 
interest in our discussion is the demand equation. The price 
SE 
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elasticity for bus demand is determined to be -.663, which is 
consistent with the theory of the downward sloping demand curve. 
It is interesting to note that this number represents a 
relatively price-inelastic curve. This may be explained by the 
constant proliferation of student and elderly discount vouchers 
by Greyhound and Trailways in an attempt at discriminating the 
more price-sensitive travelers. The t-statistic for this 
variable is -1.40, which is statistically significant at the .20 
level. 
According to the results, the demand for bus ~ervice is 
income-elastic (1.2). In other words, a small rise in personal 
disposable income yields a larger increase in the quantity of bus 
service demanded. Assuming that bus service is a normal good, 
this finding is also consistent with economic theory. This 
result is statistically significant at the .20 level. 
We now turn to the variable of salient interest in this 
paper, the price of air service. The elasticity estimate for 
this variable is .473, which indicates that the demand for bus 
service is relatively inelastic with respect to air fares. The 
t-statistic for the price of air service is 1.49, which is 
statistically significant at the .20 level. The coefficient of 
this term is positive, confirming the expectation that a price 
rise in air service leads to a rise in the quantity demanded of 
bus service. This is also consistent with the theory of cross-
substitutability of goods. What is most important in this 
discussion, however, is not the effect of a price rise, but 
rather the effect of a price drop. This model appears to confirm 
the hypothesis that a drop in the price of air service will lead 
to a drop in the quantity of bus service demanded. 
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Before we conclude this section, we synthesize our findinqs 
to determine the effect that derequlation has had on the 
intercity bus industry. The Airline Derequlation Act essentially 
opened up the industry to new entrants. Increased competition 
forced the price level to decline, which increased the quantity 
of air service demanded. This led to a decrease in the demand 
curve facinq the bus industry. This is qraphically represented 
in Fiqure 21, as the shift from Demandold to Demandnew. In an 
attempt to eliminate unprofitable routes, thereby trimminq 
losses, the supply of bus service shifted up and to the left. This is 
graphically represented as the shift from supplYold to supplynew• 
An additional supply curve is included, SupplYalternate' because 
some firms, as reported by the ICC, attempted to raise fares in 
an attempt to recover lost revenues from the recession. The 
overall effect has been a relatively insignificant change in the 
price level of bus service, but a considerable loss in the 
quantity of bus service demanded. 
VIII Conclusion 
The intercity bus industry has seen increased competition 
both intramodally and intermodally. The former was a result of 
derequlation within the industry itself, and had little impact 
upon the financial status of individual carriers. The increase 
in intermodal competition, which arose as a consequence of the 
new low-fare airlines, has had a profound effect on the bus 
industry. Through our analysis we have determined that the 
Figu re 21 
Cross Substitution Effect of Airline Deregulation 
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Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 did, in fact; create 'spillover ' 
effects with regard to the bus industry. Although there are a 
number of factors which have contributed to the bus industry's 
decline, I would suggest that none have been as injurious to the 
industry as airline deregulation. 
Based on statistical evidence of the demand demographics of 
these two industries, airlines and buses appear to service very 
different divisions of the population. Buses dominate short 
distance routes while airplanes predominate over longer hauls. 
Furthermore, there is a considerable divergence between the 
income categories of these modes, where buses and airlines, 
respectively service the lower and higher income gr~ups. This 
same sort of relationship exists for age classification. Closer 
examination of these differences, however, reveals that there 
exists a large area of substitution between these demand 
categories. 
Survival of the bus industry along major intercity routes is 
to a large degree dependent upon the performance of the airline 
industry. Strong evidence suggests that the industry is tending 
toward a more concentrated state. There appears to be a high 
mortality rate among new entrants. For evidence toward this end, 
one need only cite the recent acquisition of People Express or 
the financial collapse in late August, 1986 of Frontier Airlines 
Inc., for evidence toward this end. Daniel F. May, president and 
chief executive officer of Republic Airlines, believes that the 
major reason for this high failure rate is that the current fares 
do not reflect carrier's cost structures: 
If they were pricing their product correctly, they 
-would be making money; Instead, a lot of them are 
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going out of business. 54 
Furthermore, Melvin Brenner, airline economist, believes that the 
airline fare wars will not persist much longer. He cites such 
examples as the $99 New York-California fare as "absurdities" 
which are " ••• grossly inadequate to cover cost, even at a 100 
percent load factor. II55 It is for these reasons that ex-CAB 
chairman Alfred E. Kahn believes that the industry will become 
more concentrated in the future: 
All these things make it impossible to say with 
confidence that the industry is not already evolving 
into an uncomfortably tight oligopoly. 
A more concentrated airline industry would limit the degree 
of competition within markets. One consequence this might have 
would be to raise the price level of current air fares. 
Depending on the extent of the increase, this could allow the 
intercity bus industry to regain a portion of its lost market 
share. Furthermore, a decre~se in competition in the airline 
industry might lend itself to a decrease in consumer convenience. 
This would make bus travel a more attractive option to consumers. 
It is unlikely, at least in the near future, that any major 
upheaval in the airline's current status will ensue . After the 
period of experimentation that followed the passage of the ADA, 
and the turbulence caused by the oil price shock of 1979-80, the 
industry is in need of stability. 
There is a glimpse of hope for renovation within the bus 
industry, however. In January of this year, Fred G. Curry, 
former head of Trailways, acquired Greyhound Lines. This 
transfer of management may facilitate the renegotiation of labor 
contracts in the future. If this end is pursued it is probable 
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that the reductions in cost will allow Greyhound, and force other 
carriers, to price fares at levels that are more competitive with 
airlines. Not too suprisinqly, Greyhound employees are dreadinq 
such cuts, 
Lately Greyhound drivers had taken to wearinq their 
corporate-emblem pins upside down. perhap~6a fresh 
start will qet the hound back on its feet. 
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APPENDIX A 
Regression Results of Intercity Bus costs* 
Variable Coefficient 




R2 = .0001 





* Reproduced from Ph.D. Thesis, The Intercity Bus Industry, by 
Elizabeth Pinkston, 1975. 
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APPENDIX B 






Revenue Passenger Miles for domestic air flights. 
Producer Price Index for Jetfue1. 
CONC = Concentration Ratio for domestic air industry, derived by 
dividing the revenue passenger miles for the top four firms 
by the total for the whole domestic industry. 
Pair = Consumer Price Index for domestic air travel. 
y = Personal Disposable Income per capita, nominal. 





CPI = Consumer Price Index 
supply Equation 
RPM .. lO.593 
(2.57) 
+ .l02 JET - .954 CONC + .336 Pair 
(.080) (2.786) (.220) S.E. 
RPM = ll.99 DW = l.22 SER = .094 
Frequency: Annual Period: 1970-l985 
Demand Equation without bus price 
RPM = ";'9.647 
(3.74l) 
+ 2.206 Y 
( .443) 
+ .270 Pair 
(.065) S.E. 
RPM = ll.99 DW = l.57 SER = .059 
Frequency: Annual Period: 1970-1985 
Demand Equation with bus price 
RPM = -6.4l6 
(7.66) 
+ l.805 Y 
( .943) 
DW = l.46 SER =.058 
+ .l25 Pair 
( .305) 
+ .225 Pbus 
( .462) S.E. 
APPENDIX C 
Inclusion of I>uJumy Variable for Price of Air in Bus Demand Equation 







= Total intercity bus passenger-miles, annual 
= Consumer Price Index for intercity bus travel 
= Consumer Price Index for air travel 
Personal Disposable Income per capita, nominal 
Producer Price Index for gasoline 
Dummy variable for Deregulation 
where, 
D = 0 
D = 1 
for years 1970-1977 
for years 1978-1985 
DPair = Dummy variable multiplied by the price of air travel 
Bus Demand 
log Q - -2.68 - .663 log Pbus + .473 log Pair + .469 log Y + 2 . 467 D - .488 DPair 
(6.28) (.525) (.539) 
SER = .046 DW 
Frequency: Annual 
= 2.15 Q = 3.26 
Period: 1970-1985 
(.761) (1.36) ( .263 ) SE 
In order to test whether these results are significantly 






The null hypotheis is that the dummy variables are equal to 
Ho : D = 0 
The alternative hypothesis is that the dummy variables are 
not equal to zero, 
Ha : D = 0 
Computation shows that the derived F-statistic is not greater 
than F-critical, 
.7158 < 4.10 
Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there was no 
change in the slope and intercept of the demand curve after 
deregulation. 
·-- -_ .. - .. .. - .. _-- ,---
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APPENDIX D 
DATA USED FOR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Year Bu§PasMil CPIBus DPPerCap CPIAiI PPIGas Concet:lt AirRPM Jetfuel CPI 
. ru.!: 
l21Q 23,3 lli..Q 8134,0 119,4 104,0 ,615 104,2 ~ 116 
illl 25,3 136,1 8322,0 lll.....§. 100,9 ,589 106,3 ,82 121 
1972 25,5 140,1 8562,0 ill....1 lQL.l ,585 118,1 ,82 125 
l2ll 25,6 145,7 9042,0 134,7 230,3 ......2l2. 126,J ,97 133 
1974 26,4 l2.l....Q 886Z,O 145,9 203,2 ,565 129,7 l.....2l 148 
19Z5 2l...J.. J.M...Q 8944,0 ill....Q lli...2 ~ JJ1,7 2....ll. 161 
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